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résumé
Depuis le tournant du siècle, la délégation progressive des fonctions exercées par l’État 
congolais (RDC) aux entreprises (notamment internationales) a été parallèle à la libéralisation 
progressive de l’économie congolaise. Ce phénomène a été expliqué théoriquement par un 
effondrement de l’État congolais dans les années 1990 dû principalement à la corruption et à 
la mauvaise gestion du gouvernement. Ancré dans une interprétation historique alternative de 
cet effondrement, et basé sur des interviews et un passage en revue de la littérature qui révèlent 
l’impact limité du développement local dirigé par des entreprises dans les principales régions 
minières de la RDC, le présent article examine les possibilités de profiter de la présence des 
sociétés minières transnationales pour soutenir les processus de développement local dirigés par 
l’État. On fait valoir que la réalisation de ceci nécessitera une maximisation de l’appropriation 
par l’État du surplus créé par l’exploitation minière industrielle et la redistribution de ce 
surplus aux structures gouvernementales locales –  autrement dit : aux « entités territoriales 
décentralisées ». Les principaux défis et opportunités qui entourent ces processus seront 
identifiés et discutés. Les résultats sont fondés sur des recherches menées entre janvier et mars 
2016 à Kinshasa et dans six des principales provinces minières de la RDC. 
1. inTroduCTion1
As early as 2000, Ugandan political economist Yash Tandon noted “that 
development theory is increasingly turning to see if capital can be made more 
accountable to concerns of human welfare”. 2 The increasingly developmen-
tal function expected of corporations can be seen today in the UN’s ‘Global 
Compact’ with transnational corporations and the emergence of organisations 
such as the International Organisation for Standardisation and the Internatio-
nal Council of Mining and Metals. The outcome has been a broad shift away 
from the developmental state and towards a more privatised model of social 
and spatial regulation.3 
Dynamics in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) reflect this 
global trend. Since the collapse of the Congolese state in the 1990s, and with 
1  The author would like to thank Oxfam for its generous contribution to the field research 
undertaken for this article, and the two anonymous reviewers for improving its overall quality 
and coherence.
2 TANDON, Y., “FDI, Globalization, UNCTAD and Human Development”, Third World 
Network, 2000, p. 1.
3 LARSEN, M., LANKSEN, P., FOLD, N., “Does FDI Create Linkages in Mining? The Case of 
Gold Mining in Ghana”, in RUGRAFF, E., SANCHEZ-ANCOCHEA, D., SUMNER, A. (eds.), 
Transnational Corporations and Development Policy: Critical Perspectives, London, Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2009, pp. 246-273.
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the liberalisation of the economy since the turn of the century, previously 
state-held functions have been increasingly delegated to corporate actors. In 
particular, given the centrality of mining to the Congolese economy, these 
functions have been transferred to transnational mining corporations (TN-
MCs) through the now sectorally mainstreamed concept of ‘corporate social 
responsibility’ (CSR).4 The rise of CSR in the DRC has been theoretically 
supported and sustained by the ‘good governance’ agenda – adhered to by a 
number of Congo scholars – which posits government corruption and misma-
nagement as prime causal explanations for the failure of the DRC to benefit 
from its resource wealth.5 To remedy this situation, Englebert advocates that 
“what is…generally needed is a disengagement of the state from the economy 
and society”.6
This article departs from such a diagnosis and prescription, and is guided 
instead by an alternative literature, which highlights the historical significance 
of the early years of President Mobutu’s rule, and the importance of external 
economic shocks in bringing this period to an abrupt end. During this period, 
from 1966 to 1974, the country embarked on its only sustained attempt to con-
struct a nation-state capable of transcending regional and ethnic divides. The 
number of provinces was reduced from 21 to nine, and state representatives 
were moved around the country every three years and “normally could not 
serve in their home area”.7 Citizenship was extended to include marginalised 
and discriminated groups in the east of the country. The education system was 
nationalised, achieving 92 per cent primary school enrolment and increased 
access to the secondary and tertiary sectors.8 A national health system num-
bering 500,000 employees was established that “was generally regarded as a 
model for primary and community health care in the developing world”.9 The 
economy was growing, as “Congo rivalled Nigeria and South Africa for the 
economic leadership of Africa”.10
4 MCMAHON, G., “The World Bank’s Evolutionary Approach to Mining Sector Reform”, 
World Bank, 2010. 
5 GARRETT, N., LINTZER, M., “Can Katanga’s Mining Sector Drive Growth and Development 
in the DRC?”, Journal of Eastern African Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2010, pp. 400-424; DE 
PUTTER, T., DECREE, S., “Le potential minier de La RDC: Mythes et composantes d’une 
dynamique minière”, in MARYSSE, S., TSHONDA, J. (eds.), Conjonctures Congolaises 2012: 
Politique, secteur minier et gestion des ressources naturelles en RD Congo, Paris, L’Harmattan, 
2013; ENGLEBERT, P. “Democratic Republic of Congo: Growth for All? Challenges and 
Opportunities for a New Economic Future”, The Brenthurst Foundation, 2014.
6 ENGLEBERT, P., op. cit., 2014, p. 16.
7 HESSELBEIN, G., “The Rise and Decline of the Congolese State: An Analytical Narrative on 
State-Making”, Crisis States Research Centre, 2007, p. 25. 
8 PUTZEL, J., LINDEMANN, S., SCHOUTEN, C., “Drivers of Change in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo: The Rise and Decline of the State and Challenges for Reconstruction”, 
Crisis States Research Centre, 2008, p. v.
9 Ibidem, p. 31.
10 TREFON, T., VAN HOYWEGHEN, S., SMIS, S., “State Failure in the Congo: Perceptions & 
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Yet from 1974, things quickly fell apart. Copper prices crashed and the 
cost of oil rose enormously. As an industrialising country still heavily depen-
dent on imported inputs, “the sudden lack of foreign exchange affected indus-
trial sector output immediately”.11 Many Congolese who found themselves 
running state-owned or private enterprises as a result of the ‘Zairianisation’ 
of the economy were ill prepared and ill equipped to assume their roles. By 
the early 1980s, “black markets and smuggling had taken over, the control 
of foreign exchange had become meaningless, and the subsistence economy 
was significantly increased”.12 In 1983 the government received a World Bank 
Structural Adjustment Programme, which set about dismantling what was left 
of the state administration Mobutu had been working to modernise and ex-
pand.13  
The reduction of bureaucratic structures and central government resour-
ces led Mobutu to abandon his efforts to construct a horizontal integration 
of elites and expand access to social services, moving instead to “consolida-
te his power through the multiplication of vertical networks based on ethnic 
and regional affiliation…. This is when he began to privilege his own ethnic 
group from Equateur in both administrative and military offices”.14 It was this 
fundamental shift, away from a project of nation-state building and towards 
a mode of political survival based on “reviving a tribalist logic at the core of 
the state”,15 that set in motion eventual patterns of state disintegration, conflict 
and civil war that have plagued the DRC up until today. 
From this perspective, the Congolese state is more a victim of its periphe-
rality in the global economy of the 1970s – dependent on price and demand 
mechanisms beyond its control – than an innately corrupt and mismanaged 
institution. Situated in this historical understanding, and based on interviews 
and a review of the DRC CSR literature which reveal the limited impact of 
corporate-led local development in the mining regions of the DRC, this ar-
ticle explores instead the possibilities for harnessing the presence of TNMCs 
operating in the DRC to support the reinstitution of processes of state-led lo-
cal development. The findings are based on research conducted by the author 
between January and March 2016 in Kinshasa and six of the DRC’s major 
mining provinces (Haut-Katanga, Lualaba, Kasai Oriental, Ituri, North Kivu 
and South Kivu), including field visits to mining areas in Mbuji-Mayi (Kasai 
Oriental), Kolwezi (Lualaba) and Bunia (Ituri). A total of 178 people were 
Realities”, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 29, No. 93-94, 2002, p. 380.
11 HESSELBEIN, G., “The Economic Foundations of State-Building and State-Failure: A 
Political Economy of Sub-Saharan African States”, PhD Thesis, University of Zurich, 2009, 
p. 209.
12 Ibidem, p. 214.
13 PUTZEL, J., LINDEMANN, S., SCHOUTEN, C., op. cit., pp. vii and 24.
14 Ibidem, p. vi.
15 Ibidem, p. vi.
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interviewed during the course of the research, including villagers living in 
mining areas, government officials, private sector representatives, academics 
and members of Congolese civil society.
2. meThodoLogy
As a point of departure for this article, a literature review of academic 
articles and popular reports assessing the impact of CSR programming led by 
TNMCs in the DRC was conducted. This included research available online, 
as well as a number of reports only distributed in the DRC and not accessible 
internationally at the time of writing. Following this, six provinces outside of 
Kinshasa were selected for fieldwork due to their importance to the DRC’s 
mining sector: Haut-Katanga, Lualaba, Kasai Oriental, Ituri, North Kivu and 
South Kivu. Research on an additional seventh mining province – Haut-Uélé 
– was conducted from Bunia in Ituri Province. Time was also spent in Kinsha-
sa at the beginning and end of the fieldwork to speak with national-level go-
vernment, civil society, private sector and other representatives. Finally, a nu-
mber of academics and international experts based outside of the DRC were 
consulted, either by email or by telephone.
A total of 178 people were interviewed during the course of the research. 
Table 1 divides these interviewees by group and provides an overview of the 
number interviewed from each group, as well as this number expressed as a 
percentage of the total. The largest group consulted was Congolese civil soci-
ety, representing 23 per cent of interviewees, followed by local residents and 
the private sector. Geographically, 21 per cent of the interviewees were loca-
ted in Kinshasa, 18 per cent in Haut-Katanga, 18 per cent in Lualaba, 15 per 
cent in Kasai Oriental, 14 per cent in North Kivu and South Kivu, seven per 
cent in Ituri, and seven per cent internationally. All interviews were conducted 
between January 8th and March 6th 2016.
Table 1. interviewee groups
group number interviewed as a % of the Total
Civil society 41 23
Local residents 37 21
Private sector 27 15
International NGOs 23 13
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While purposive sampling was used to ensure that each group in Table 1 
was reached, snowball sampling was the main technique employed to iden-
tify interviewees within each group. At the local level, during field visits to 
villages located in industrial mining concessions, convenience sampling was 
employed, speaking to those who appeared most interested and open to tal-
king and sharing their experiences. Semi-structured interviews were used 
throughout, in addition to group interviews in villages, with the latter techni-
que deemed more suitable when conducting research in mining regions to the 
formal requirements of holding a focus group.16 
Interviews were guided by questions related to three topics: the impact and 
effects of TNMC CSR programming; the mining sector’s tax requirements, 
including TNMC adherence to these requirements; and available mechanisms 
to redistribute mining sector revenue to the local level, including government 
adherence to these mechanisms. Interviews dealt with a combination of one 
or all three topics, depending on the interviewee’s areas of knowledge and ex-
perience. Upon completion of the fieldwork, data analysis was conducted by 
reviewing and coding all interview content to identify emerging themes and 
recurring patterns within the data. Some elementary quantitative data analysis 
was also conducted, pertaining to the Congolese government’s capture and 
redistribution of revenue generated by the mining sector.
3. beyond The rheToriC of CorporaTe soCiaL   
responsibiLiTy
Reflecting the shift away from state-led and towards corporate-driven lo-
cal development in the DRC’s mining sector, Article 452 of the country’s Mi-
ning Regulations stipulates that titleholders must develop an Environmental 
Management Plan to «improve the well-being of local populations by putting 
in place social and economic development programmes».17 Article 458 of the 
same Regulations specifies that the titleholder must submit an annual report 
to the Environmental Protection Agency in the Ministry of Mines; to include 
information on the implementation of a Sustainable Development Plan desig-
ned to improve the human development of local populations.18 
While these plans are only exceptionally made public, numerous recent 
case studies provide detailed descriptive portraits and analysis of the plan-
ning, implementation and impact of mining sector CSR programming across 
the country. The overall picture presented by this literature is of a CSR sector 
that is ad hoc, non-strategic, non-consultative, prone to elite capture and lar-
16 GEENEN, S., “The Political Economy of Access to Gold Mining and Trade in South Kivu, 
DRC”, PhD Thesis, University of Antwerp, 2014, p. 91.
17 DRC GOVERNMENT, “Mining Regulations”, 2003, p. 210. Author translation.
18 Ibidem, p. 214. Author translation.
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gely unresponsive to local needs and concerns. 19 Research on the CSR pro-
gramming of the Canadian gold corporation Banro, operating in South Kivu 
Province, concludes that – despite positive efforts by Banro to commit to tran-
snational voluntary standards – the programming is largely ineffective and the 
company has ultimately “reproduced an elite alliance for stability that is fairly 
exclusive and not perceived as legitimate by the local population”.20 Research 
on the local development impact of the Congolese subsidiary KibaliGold, di-
rectly managing one of sub-Saharan Africa’s largest gold mines in Haut-Uélé 
Province and jointly owned by RandGold and AngloGold Ashanti, presents 
similar findings. The report notes, “the lack of a true understanding and dialo-
gue between KibaliGold and the population living in its area of impact”, with 
the result that the company’s arrival has created local conflict, discontent and 
tension.21
The literature also notes that, far from promoting local development, the 
arrival of TNMCs into rural areas of the DRC has created new processes of 
social dislocation and exclusion through the forced displacement of thousands 
of villagers and artisanal miners,22 the mass expropriation of land without 
fair compensation,23 and the forced resettlement of those displaced, often to 
remote areas in poorly constructed houses, and with decreased quality of ac-
19 PEYER, C., MAILLARD, Y., “Contract, Human Rights and Taxation: How a Company 
Exploits a Country, The Case of Glencore in the DRC”, Bread for All & Fastenopfer, 2009; 
THE CARTER CENTER, “Les investissements miniers en République Démocratique du 
Congo: Développement ou appauvrissement des communautés locales?”, 2012; AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, “Profits and Loss, Mining and Human Rights in Katanga”, 2013; 
GEENEN, S., CLAESSENS, K., “Disputed Access to the Gold Sites in Luhwindja, Eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2013, 
pp. 85-108; ASADHO, “Quel est la part des communautés locales de Luano, Kalukuluku et 
Kawama dans le projet Ruashi Mining?”, 2014; GEENEN, S., “Dispossession, Displacement 
and Resistance: Artisanal Miners in a Gold Concession in South-Kivu, DRC”, Resources 
Policy, Vol. 40, 2014, pp. 90-99; GEENEN, S., HONKE, J., “Land Grabbing by Mining 
Companies: Local Contentions and State Reconfiguration in South Kivu (DRC)”, in ANSOMS, 
A., HILHORST, T. (eds.), Losing Your Land: Dispossession in the Great Lakes, Oxford, James 
Currey, 2014, pp. 58-81; RUGARABURA, P., BATUMIKE, P., “Contribution à l'analyse de la 
nature juridique des mesures de délocalisation des populations au profit de Banro Corporation 
à Twangiza”, in MARYSSE, S., TSHONDA, J. (eds.), Conjonctures congolaises 2013: Percée 
sécuritaire, flottements politiques et essor économique, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2014, pp. 199-222; 
MAKULA, A., KAMBOLA, D.,  “Rapport d’évaluation des impacts du projet Sicomines sur 
les droits des communautés locales dans la région de Kolwezi”, ASIBOG & IBGDH, 2014 ; 
CORDAID, “L'exploitation minière au coeur des zones rurales: Quel développement pour les 
communautés locales?”, 2015; MAISON DES MINES DU KIVU, “Evaluation des impacts 
des investissement miniers de Banro Corporation sur les droits humains en RDC”, 2015; ORN/
CDJP, CERN, PAX, “Géant minier Kibali: Oter les impuretés pour que l'or soit pur”, 2015.
20 GEENEN, S., HONKE, J., op. cit., p. 25. See also GEENEN, S., CLAESSENS, K., op. cit., 
pp. 85-108; GEENEN, S., op. cit., pp. 90-99.
21 ORN/CDJP, CERN, PAX, op. cit., p. 49. Author translation.
22 ORN/CDJP, CERN, PAX, op. cit., 2015.
23 ASADHO, op. cit., 2014.
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cess to water and arable land.24 The findings from the DRC reflect those of the 
wider literature, which finds mining sector CSR programming across Africa 
to: propose ill-suited technical solutions to political problems;25 be ineffective 
in improving the lives of targeted populations;26 lead to elite capture;27 and 
create regional imbalances as communities in resource-rich areas receive CSR 
funding and those in non-resource-rich areas do not.28 
Interviews across the DRC exploring the impact of CSR programming 
provide further support to these findings, with the overall impression of ge-
neral frustration at the lack of CSR-led local development reflected in one in-
terviewee’s statement that “the absence of social and economic development 
around mining areas is shameful”.29 While there was a strong sentiment that 
some Western mining companies had better CSR policies and practices than 
non-Western (in particular Chinese) companies, many interviewees bemoa-
ned the fact that most CSR work is ad-hoc, non-strategic and non-consulta-
tive.30 One extreme example was given by a community in Kolwezi, where a 
TNMC distributed footballs and children’s football kits to a local community, 
with no prior consultation. More than three years later, the company had yet 
to return.31 Particularly striking was the oft-noted problem of a one-way dia-
logue, led by mining companies, with civil society and local groups unable 
to access the companies or hold them accountable. Elite capture was another 
theme to emerge from the interviews, with customary and government struc-
tures accused by interviewees across the country of monopolising the benefits 
of the presence of industrial mining to the exclusion of local communities.32 
Yet despite the weaknesses and limits of CSR highlighted by the litera-
ture review and the interviews, many of the recommendations arising out of 
the DRC literature remain within the CSR framework, calling for the need to 
strengthen the quality and impact of CSR programming and expand its cover-
age. One study calls on mining companies in the DRC to “adopt more innova-
24 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, op. cit., 2013.
25 LUNING, “Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) for Exploration: Consultants, Companies 
and Communities in Processes of Engagements”, Resources Policy, Vol. 12, 2012, pp. 205-211. 
26 BUSH, R., “‘Soon There Will Be No-One Left to Take the Corpses to the Morgue’: 
Accumulation and Abjection in Ghana’s Mining Communities”, Resources Policy, Vol. 34, 
2009, pp. 57-63.
27 NEGI, R., “The Mining Boom, Capital, and Chiefs in the New Copperbelt”, in FRASER, 
A., LARMER, M. (eds.), Zambia, Mining and Neoliberalism, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 
2010, pp- 209-236.
28 LARSEN, M., LANKSEN, P., FOLD, N., op. cit., pp. 246-273. 
29 Interview with civil society representative, January 2016, Lubumbashi.
30 Interviews with civil society representatives, January and February 2016, Kinshasa, 
Lubumbashi and Bukavu.
31 Interview with community members, February 2016, Kolwezi.
32 Interviews with civil society representatives, donors and academics, January, February and 
March 2016, Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Mbuji-Mayi, Kolwezi, Bunia and Bukavu.
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tive [CSR] approaches”,33 one on a mining company to “apply the Voluntary 
Principles on human rights security” in its CSR approach,34 and another for a 
mining company to “organise new consultations that involve all social strata 
of the affected communities”.35 Meanwhile, the role of the state is largely 
restricted to overseeing the implementation of CSR programming, such as the 
recommendation that the Congolese Government “ensure the [community] 
consultations made by mining companies are effective and in respect of the 
mining regulations”.36 
These are all examples, to return to Tandon’s earlier phrase, of working to 
make corporate capital more accountable to concerns of human welfare. Yet in 
so doing, the literature undermines the Congolese state’s developmental role 
by implicitly endorsing its replacement with what Negi has called “the weaker 
institution of CSR”.37 Departing from this perspective, the remainder of this 
article explores the possibilities for harnessing the presence of TNMCs in the 
DRC to support not improved and expanded corporate-led development, but 
the reinstitution of local processes of state-led development.
4. maximising sTaTe CapTure of mining seCTor   
surpLus
The starting point for such efforts must first and foremost revolve around 
maximising state capture of the surplus generated by the DRC’s mining sec-
tor, from which improvements in the state’s developmental capabilities and 
the redistribution of this surplus to provincial and local levels of government 
can flow. The two most comprehensive fiscal studies assessing the mining sec-
tor’s contribution to state revenue find it to be significantly below its potential. 
The first and most recent study, conducted by the German Society for Interna-
tional Cooperation (GIZ), calculated that between 2011 and 2014, total state 
revenue collected from the sector amounted to a mere 5.98 per cent of total 
mining sector revenue during the same period.38 The second study concluded 
that in 2010 and 2011 the Congolese state levied around a 13 per cent tax rate 
over the sector, in contrast to the 45 per cent tax rate considered reasonable by 
the World Bank.39 Consequently, the authors recommend a tripling of receipts 
to the state as a realistic goal without strangling the sector.40 These studies 
33 CORDAID, op. cit., p. 8. Author translation.
34 ORN/CDJP, CERN, PAX, op. cit., p. 71. Author translation.
35 MAKULA, A., KAMBOLA, D., op. cit., p. 13. Author translation.
36 ASADHO, op. cit., p. 37.
37 NEGI, R., op. cit., p. 39.
38 GIZ, “Analyse et potentiel de croissance des revenus du secteur minier en RDC”, 2015, p. 33.
39 LUBABU, T., “Stefaan Marysse: ‘Au Congo, un secret ne reste pas longtemps un secret’, 
Business et Finances, 2015, pp. 4-5.
40 MARYSSE, S., TSHIMANGA, C., “La renaissance spectaculaire du secteur minier en RDC: 
Ou va la Rente Minière?”, in MARYSSE, S., TSHONDA, J. (eds.), Conjonctures Congolaises 
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suggest that there is significant scope in the DRC for increasing the state’s 
capture of the surplus generated by industrial mining.
There are two ways in which this increased tax contribution can be achie-
ved: enforcing TNMC adherence to their fiscal responsibilities; and enacting 
fiscal reform to increase the tax rate. This second possibility has been under-
way since 2012 through the Mining Code revision process, which carries the 
potential to increase state revenue from the sector and better align the DRC’s 
mining tax system with other low- and lower-middle-income Francophone 
African countries.41 It would for example increase the profit tax rate from 30 
to 35 per cent, matching the rate in Cameroon. It would also increase the range 
of mining royalty rates to 0.5 to 6 per cent (depending on the mineral), compa-
rable with the rates in Burkina Faso (three to seven per cent), Cameroon (two 
to eight per cent), and Cote d’Ivoire (2.5 to three per cent). 42 However, since 
this revision process has been completed and has been suspended indefinitely 
in Parliament,43 the focus here will be on exploring the first possibility of en-
suring TNMC adherence to existing fiscal responsibilities. 
As one interviewee put it, “many if not all [mining companies] are trying 
to avoid as many taxes as possible”.44 While outright avoidance is clearly an 
issue (in 2013, for example, 80 percent of mining title holders did not pay 
their annual surface area taxes45), transfer pricing was raised by multiple inter-
viewees as the most serious issue, through which TNMCs avoid paying taxes 
in the DRC and syphon profits overseas, to the net loss of Congolese state 
revenue. Transfer pricing refers to all aspects of intra-company trade (trade 
between two or more companies within the same legal entity), summarised in 
Peyer et al.’s work exploring the practice in the DRC:
“Sophisticated strategies allow multinational companies to ‘optimise’ 
their tax burden and move profits to tax havens or non-transparent jurisdic-
tions. One commonly used option consists of over-invoicing for imports and 
under-invoicing for exports to reduce company profits in a given country. 
Granting licences or loans to companies in the same group can also reduce 
the profits of a subsidiary and correspondingly increase those of another sub-
sidiary registered in a tax haven. It is difficult to establish – in the absence 
of lengthy and costly legal proceedings – whether such practices are legal or 
2012: Politique, secteur minier et gestion des ressources naturelles en RD Congo, Paris, 
L’Harmattan, 2013, pp. 11–46.
41 For a summary of the proposed fiscal reform, see GIZ, “Analyse et potentiel de croissance des 
revenus du secteur minier en RDC”, 2015.
42 LAPORTE, B., DE QUATREBARBES, C., “What Do We Know About the Sharing of 
Mineral Resource Rent in Africa?”, Resources Policy, Vol. 46, 2015, pp. 241-247.
43 http://af.reuters.com/article/drcNews/idAFL5N16I5EV, visited on 11 March 2016.
44 Interview with DRC mining sector expert, February 2016, phone call. All interview quotations 
from interviews conducted in French have been translated into English by the author. 
45 GIZ, op. cit., p. 25.
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illegal”.46  
The over-invoicing for imports by TNMCs was raised on several occa-
sions by interviewees. According to a civil society representative monitoring 
TNMC investment levels, companies artificially increase the total amount of 
imported material during the construction phase to raise the overall size of the 
investment and prolong avoidance of corporate tax payment.47 As one Con-
golese mining journalist has written, “the problem of the Congolese state’s 
understanding of the true value of mining investments and their certification 
constitutes a hole for the national economy”.48 The scope for the under-invoi-
cing of exports in the DRC is also considerable, and was highlighted by many 
during interviews. Senior government officials in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi 
noted that the government lacks the capacity to verify the quality of the ore 
being exported, and depends upon the mining companies to conduct the requi-
red tests and declare this quality themselves.49 This raises the risk that the true 
export value might far exceed its declared value, resulting in the Congolese 
subsidiary avoiding the payment of royalties and corporate tax.50
Case studies of TNMC accounting practices in the DRC support the wi-
dely held sentiment among Congolese civil society and government official 
interviewees that transfer pricing is a serious problem in the country. A 2014 
study of Swiss-based Glencore found that its subsidiaries “transfer a substan-
tial proportion of profits abroad. This practice…is not illegal, but is a way 
of avoiding payment of taxes on profits and dividends to the DRC state”.51 
The practice is facilitated by Glencore’s organisational structure, whereby its 
Congolese subsidiary (Kamoto Copper Company, or KCC) is majority owned 
by companies registered in the British Virgin Islands, Guernsey and the Isle 
of Man (jurisdictions with a zero or very low rate of taxation). These compa-
nies, in turn, are controlled by Canada-registered Katanga Mining Limited 
(KML), which Glencore controls through a 75 per cent stake. With this ela-
borate structure in place, the DRC-based subsidiary KCC sells its products to 
Canada-based KML. During the five-year period studied, from 2009 to 2013, 
KCC ran at a loss of hundreds of millions of dollars per year, while KML ran 
at a net profit of $401 million.52 The report concluded that over the five years, 
Glencore’s tax strategy resulted in a net loss of revenue to the Congolese state 
46 PEYER, C., FEENEY, P., MERCIER, F., “PR or Progress? Glencore’s Corporate Responsibility 
in the DRC”, Bread for All, Rights and Accountability in Development and Fastenopfer, 2014.
47 Interview with civil society representative, January 2016, Kinshasa.
48 http://www.nresources.cd/index.php/reportage, visited on 12 March 2016. Author translation.
49 Interviews with senior government officials at the Ministry of Mines and the Ministry of 
Finance, February 2016, Kinshasa and Lubumbashi.
50 Interview with civil society representative, January 2016, Kinshasa.
51 PEYER, C., FEENEY, P., MERCIER, F., op. cit., p. 97.
52 The use of the dollar sign throughout the paper represents US dollars.
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of $153.7 million.53 
Similarly, Marysse and Tshimanga found that Tenke Fungurume Hol-
dings, the Congolese subsidiary of the American TNMC Freeport McMoRan 
– considered by many as an industry leader for its transparency and com-
mitment to operating in accordance with the highest international standards 
– adopts the same practices, artificially reducing its profits made in the DRC 
through transactions between itself and its subsidiaries.54 The authors conclu-
de that alongside government-focused initiatives such as EITI, “we would like 
an international mechanism to control as effectively the totality of multinatio-
nal [mining] company operations”.55 
The valuation of mining-related imports to and exports from the DRC was 
felt by many government official and Congolese civil society interviewees 
to be “a very big problem here in Congo… [because] it’s the company who 
manages it alone”.56 The unequal power relations between the “under-equip-
ped, poorly trained and under-paid” Congolese fiscal administration57 and the 
superior technical and financial resources of TNMCs, often staffed with inter-
national teams of legal specialists and tax advisors, clearly leads – as the abo-
ve case studies demonstrate – to significant financial losses to the Congolese 
public treasury.
One argument put forward by TNMCs in response to claims regarding the 
weak fiscal contribution of the mining sector, and heard several times during 
interviews with mining company and private sector representatives, is that 
most mining projects in the DRC have yet to recover their investment, and 
as a result are not yet paying the 30 per cent corporate tax on profits made.58 
Thus, interviewees stated, rather than criticising the fiscal system for being 
insufficient and advocating a revision of the Mining Code to increase the tax 
rate, patience is required until more projects begin turning profits.
Given that mineral production at many mining projects began relatively 
recently, it should indeed be the case that over the coming years, corporate 
tax – one of the most important mining taxes – will increase, as more TNMCs 
begin to recover their investments. At the same time, Articles 222 and 340 
of the Mining Code allow for the establishment of conventions with “more 
favourable fiscal dispositions” that exist outside of and take precedent over 
53 PEYER, C., FEENEY, P., MERCIER, F., op. cit., p. 104.
54 MARYSSE, S., TSHIMANGA, C., “Les ‘trous noirs’ de la rente minière en RDC”, in 
MARYSSE, S., TSHONDA, J. (eds.), Conjonctures congolaises 2013: Percée sécuritaire, 
flottements politiques et essor économique, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2014, p. 149.
55 Ibidem, p. 162. Author translation.
56 Interview with civil society representative, January 2016, Kinshasa.
57 GIZ, op. cit., p. 13.
58 Interviews with mining company and private sector representatives, January and February 
2016, Kinshasa and Lubumbashi.
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the Mining Code.59 Many TNMCs hold such conventions, which contain ge-
nerous tax holidays on corporate and other taxes. For example, the convention 
of the Canadian corporation Banro exonerates it from paying mining royalties 
and corporate tax for the first ten years of production.60 This legal loophole, 
combined with the transfer pricing practices discussed above, question the 
extent to which corporate investment recovery will represent a boon for state 
revenue, although it is to be hoped that the overall corporate tax contributions 
of the sector will indeed increase significantly over the next decade.
Considering the above, and in line with Marysse and Tshimanga’s con-
clusion, establishing an international mechanism to control TNMC financi-
al practices and strengthening the Congolese state’s ability to provide fiscal 
oversight to and regulation of the mining sector should be higher priorities 
for international stakeholders than is currently the case. The tenets of ‘good 
governance’ and CSR programming appear to present more of a distraction 
from, rather than a contribution to, these most critical of tasks. If the state is 
deprived of its expected share of the surplus, and in light of the limits of CSR 
highlighted in the preceding section, how is the DRC to benefit from the pre-
sence of a foreign-controlled mining economy? 
5. redisTribuTing The surpLus To The LoCaL 
LeveL
Once captured by the state, there are two primary mechanisms through 
which state revenue generated by the mining sector can be redistributed to the 
‘decentralised territorial entities’ (ETDs) – comprised of the city, the muni-
cipality, the sector and the chiefdom – to support local processes of state-led 
development. First, Article 1 of the Congolese Constitution outlines that each 
province has the right to retain 40 percent of the revenue it raises, with 60 
percent allocated to central government.61 Article 115 of Law No. 08/016 of 
October 2008, related to the composition, organisation and functioning of the 
ETDs, states that “the decentralised territorial entities have the right to 40 
percent of the national revenue allocated to the provinces”.62 In other words, 
if a province raises $100 million in tax revenue, central government would re-
ceive $60 million and the ETDs $16 million (40 percent of the $40 million al-
located to the province), leaving the provincial government with $24 million.
Second, Article 242 of the Mining Code stipulates a specific repartition 
for mining royalties, with 60 percent going to central government, 25 percent 
59 DRC GOVERNMENT, “Mining Code”, 2002, p. 103. Author translation.
60 MAISON DES MINES DU KIVU, op. cit., pp. 26-30.
61 DRC GOVERNMENT, “Constitution de la Republique Democratique du Congo”, 2006, p. 
2. Author translation.
62 COURT OF AUDITORS, “Audit des recettes à caractère national des régies financières 
(DGDA, DGI et DGRAD)”, DRC Government, 2013, p. 8. Author translation.
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to provincial government and 15 percent to the “Town or Territory” in which 
the mining project that paid the royalties is located.63 The 15 percent of the ro-
yalties that go to the ETDs are to be “affected exclusively to the achievement 
of infrastructure with a community interest”.64 However, it is clear from inter-
views and analysis of available data that the redistribution of state revenue to 
the provincial and local level is not adhered to as per the requirements of the 
Constitution and the Mining Code. 
The main agencies within the Ministry of Finance responsible for collec-
ting taxes from the mining sector are the General Directorate of Tax (DGI), 
the General Directorate of Customs and Excise (DGDA) and the Revenue De-
partment (DGRAD). In 2013, the Court of Auditors ran an audit of these three 
agencies for a four-year period covering 2007 to 2010, with the objective 
of determining the amount of revenue each province had the right to expect 
given their contribution to the public treasury, and how much they actually 
received. 
The audit found that, across the four-year period, only 42 percent of the 
total amount that should have been redistributed by central government was 
redistributed, and that within this redistribution, there were significant dis-
crepancies across the provinces.65 For example, in 2010 Bandundu received 
2,725 percent of the total it was due by central government, Equateur 1,563 
percent, Kasai-Occidental 1,332 percent and Maniema 1,108 percent. By con-
trast, Kinshasa received 9.9 percent, Bas-Congo 15 percent and Katanga 19.2 
percent.66 
According to a former senior government official, the results of the Court 
of Auditors report are due to the fact that the three provinces of ex-Katanga, 
ex-Bas Congo and Kinshasa contribute around 90 percent of total state reve-
nue, a finding confirmed by the audit report itself. Given this reality, respec-
ting the Constitutional redistribution of national receipts would create highly 
unbalanced provincial and local development processes and risk accentuating 
inter-regional conflict, with some provinces receiving very little money and 
some receiving significant amounts. Thus, according to a number of intervie-
wees, in 2009 the government decided to redistribute revenue to the provinces 
according to the three criteria of population, surface area and performance 
(with this latter criteria understood as a province’s capacity to absorb the fi-
nancing and oversee its expenditure).67 
This would appear to explain why, for example, in 2010 Bandundu re-
ceived 2,725 percent of the revenue it was due and North Kivu only 47.4 
63 DRC GOVERNMENT, “MINING CODE”, 2002, p. 108. Author translation.
64 Ibidem, p. 109. Author translation.
65 COURT OF AUDITORS, op. cit., p. 19.
66 Ibidem, pp. 18-19.
67 Interviews with government officials and a former senior government official, January and 
February 2016, Kinshasa and Lubumbashi.
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percent, as in absolute terms Bandundu received 10.4 billion Congolese Fran-
cs and North Kivu received 9.7 billion Congolese Francs.68 Indeed, in terms 
of total amount received per province, the allocations revealed by the audit 
were relatively egalitarian, with Maniema receiving the lowest absolute level 
of redistribution at 6.8 billion Congolese Francs and Katanga the highest, at 
25.7 billion Congolese Francs.69 It does not explain, however, why central 
government failed to redistribute more than half of the total amount due to the 
provinces between 2007 and 2010.
According to a mining sector expert, the government explanation for this 
failure, stated by the Budget Minister, is that when overall revenue is too low, 
it is not possible to redistribute 40 percent of this revenue, as government 
officials in Kinshasa would not be paid.70 A senior government official at the 
Ministry of Finance added that all provincial-level civil servants are paid by 
central government, and that this salary support is taken into consideration 
when calculating the amount to be redistributed to the provinces.71 In addition, 
according to one civil society representative, certain provincial-level taxes 
(such as those introduced in ex-Katanga) are successful in raising more than 
the 40 percent of national receipts intended for the province, and so in certain 
circumstances there is no need for this redistribution to take place.72 
A similar logic extends to the failure to redistribute to local government, 
with provincial governments citing lack of adequate funding as the reason for 
the non-redistribution of revenue to the ETDs.73 Data from the Court of Audi-
tors shows that in 2012, an average of just 3.1 percent of the constitutionally 
required 40 percent was redistributed from the provinces to the ETDs, ran-
ging from 0 percent in South Kivu to 6.8 percent in ex-Katanga.74 GIZ found 
the Congolese taxation system to be characterised by “its weak capacity…to 
redistribute revenue intended for poverty reduction”.75 These findings were 
supported by several civil society and mining company representative inter-
viewees who stated their belief that, beyond covering minimal administrative 
costs, local-level revenue redistribution is not taking place.76 
For the redistribution of mining royalties, the most recent reports by the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) have analysed adherence 
to Article 242 of the Mining Code, using data from the former province of 
68 COURT OF AUDITORS, op. cit., p. 18-19.
69 Ibidem, pp. 18-19.
70 Interview with mining sector expert, January, Kinshasa.
71 Interview with senior Ministry of Finance official, February 2016, Kinshasa.
72 Interview with civil society representative, January 2016, Kinshasa.
73 COURT OF AUDITORS, op. cit., p. 8.
74 ENGLEBERT, P., MUNGONGO, E. K., “Misguided and Misdiagnosed: The Failure of 
Decentralization Reforms in the DR Congo”, African Studies Review, Vol. 59, No. 1, 2016.
75 GIZ, op. cit., p. 32. Author translation.
76 Interviews with civil society and mining company representatives, January and February 
2016, Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, North Kivu and Ituri.
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Katanga. For 2013, only $12 million of the $118 million DGRAD declared 
to have been received in mining royalties was redistributed to ex-Katanga, 
or 10 percent, significantly below the 25 percent foreseen by the Mining Co-
de.77 In 2014, this figure dropped to eight percent, with only $12.2 million of 
$160 million received in royalties from ex-Katanga sent back to the provincial 
government.78 Both reports also confirmed that, in contravention of Article 
175 of the Constitution and as per the finding of the previously-cited Court 
of Auditors assessment,79 the provincial allocations were not retained ‘at the 
source’, but collected centrally and reallocated by the Ministry of Finance in 
Kinshasa.80 
Data for the 15 percent of mining royalties meant to reach the ETDs is 
less easy to come by. The most recent EITI report notes “the declaration of the 
Ministry of Finance only relates to the part of the mining royalties transferred 
to the provincial government, it doesn’t mention the 15 percent to be sent to 
an account designated by the Town or the Territory in which mining activity 
takes place”.81 Government officials in the provinces of North Kivu and Ituri 
stated they did not have access to and had not seen data for the local level of 
mining royalty redistribution.82 Multiple attempts to meet with DGRAD – the 
agency at the Ministry of Finance responsible for collecting mining royalties – 
and other staff at the Ministry of Finance in Kinshasa to request this data were 
unsuccessful. However, interviewees were unanimous in their view that the 
redistribution of mining royalties to the ETDs is only partially taking place, or 
not at all, with a civil society representative in Kinshasa calling the redistribu-
tion of mining royalties “a disaster”.83
The common proposal put forward by many interviewees to improve the 
redistribution of mining royalties is for companies to make three separate ro-
yalty payments to central government, provincial government and local go-
vernment respectively, rather than making one payment to central government 
as is currently the case. According to one interviewee, this proposal has al-
ready been incorporated into the Forestry Code, thus setting a precedent to be 
followed in the mining sector.84 
The obvious consequence of the failure to redistribute state revenue to 
the lowest levels of government for development financing is that, as one 
civil society representative put it, “mining revenue generated by the compa-
77 EITI, “EITI-DRC 2013 Report”, 2014, p. 106. 
78 EITI, “EITI-DRC 2014 Report”, 2015, p. 98.  
79 COURT OF AUDITORS, op. cit., p. 8. 
80 EITI, “EITI-DRC 2013 Report”, 2014, p. 106; EITI, “EITI-DRC 2014 Report”, 2015, p. 100.
81 EITI, “EITI-DRC 2014 Report”, 2015, p. 100. Author translation.
82 Interviews with government officials, January and February 2016, Goma and Bunia.
83 Interview with civil society representative, January 2016, Kinshasa.
84 Interview with civil society representative, February 2016, Kinshasa.
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nies doesn’t benefit the local population”.85 A Bukavu-based academic argued 
“there is a real need for the provinces to have the resources to finance their de-
velopment”, noting that currently available resources are insufficient to allow 
for this to happen.86 According to a number of civil society representatives in 
the mining provinces of Haut Katanga and Lualaba, many Local Development 
Plans are in place – recently developed under the authority of the Ministry of 
Planning – but lack the required financing, which improved redistribution of 
national revenue and mining royalties to the ETDs would provide.87 
Recently released government data indicates that ex-Katanga Province 
generated a total of $145.3 million in mining royalties in 2014 and $131.1 
million in 2015.88 This means that across both years, from one tax alone, a 
total of $41.5 million should have reached the ETDs. This indicates the exis-
ting potential to provide significant development financing to the chronically 
under-equipped and under-funded local government structures, if better ad-
herence to existing mechanisms for the redistribution of state revenue can be 
achieved.
6. ConCLusion
Questioning whether corporate mining capital can be made more accoun-
table to concerns of human welfare, the DRC’s CSR literature responds with 
a resounding ‘no’. The central problem arising from this conclusion is neatly 
captured by Marshall’s recent assessment of mining sector CSR efforts glo-
bally:
“The companies project themselves as globally responsible players 
through glossy in-house publications with no third-party verification of the 
contents. The branding also happens at national and local levels. Rather than 
exercising corporate citizenship by paying royalties or taxes, enabling host 
governments’ revenue sources to build infrastructure and implement social 
programmes, mining companies fight for tax breaks. Then they project them-
selves as good corporate citizens through high profile and inexpensive ‘corpo-
rate social responsibility’ programmes”.89
We must then explore instead how to bring the state back into local de-
velopment processes. Such an effort must be structured around reviving local 
85 Interview with civil society representative, February 2016, Mbuji-Mayi.
86 Interview with academic, February 2016, Bukavu.
87 Interview with civil society representatives, January and February, Kinshasa, Lubumbashi 
and Bukavu.
88 Katanga Province Provincial Mining Division, “ Statistiques des notes de débit relatives à 
la redevance minière émises”, DRC Government, 2014; Katanga Province Provincial Mining 
Division, “Statistiques des notes de débit relatives à la redevance minière émises”, DRC 
Government, 2015.
89 MARSHALL, J., “Contesting Big Mining from Canada to Mozambique”, Transnational 
Institute, 2015, p. 9.
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government structures with much-needed development financing, to be achie-
ved by maximising state capture and redistribution of the surplus generated 
by industrial mining.
Internally, it appears an opportune moment to engage in the task of maxi-
mising state revenue redistribution, given recent fiscal reform in the DRC. 
According to the staff of a Congolese organisation monitoring public expen-
diture, 2016 marks the first year data will be made publically available on the 
amount of money, broken down by sector, being sent to central government by 
the provinces and localities and the amount received back at the provincial and 
local level in return. The interviewees stated that this new data would make 
it possible to closely scrutinise ETD financing for the first time, including the 
collection and repartition of mining royalties.90 Thus, while non-adherence to 
the redistribution of state revenue generated by the mining sector in the DRC 
appears systemic, recent advances in budget transparency are favourable to 
progress on this issue going forward.
This is, however, a profoundly political issue. Kuediasala contends that 
the Congolese mining sector is tightly controlled by a small political clique in 
Kinshasa, centred on the Presidency, without whose agreement nothing can be 
undertaken, and who protect certain interests that have little in common with 
the collective interest of the Congolese people.91 In addition, recent research 
indicates that decentralisation in the DRC has left the ‘rules of the game’ at the 
lower levels of governance unaffected, as it has not been coupled with change 
in the informal institutions and networks that condition state behaviour.92 This 
suggests there is little reason to expect that better financed ETD structures 
would automatically counteract the tendencies observed of corporate-led local 
development, such as local elite capture.
Yet it also hints at the solution, found during the early years of Mobutu’s 
Presidency, where administrative decentralisation was coupled with a poli-
tically centralised nation-state project that attempted to overcome regional 
and ethnically based networks of power. At the outset, Mobutu’s model “en-
joyed…a remarkably broad consensus of approval as a political formula…the 
centralised strong nation-state vision of the polity seemed to most the only 
salvation”.93 The revival of such a political formula would represent a pro-
found change in the political networks that define the Kabila regime today. Yet 
with political conflict in the country historically rooted in the divide between 
nationalists and federalists, it will undoubtedly be a long struggle to achieve 
90 Interview with civil society representatives, February 2016, Kinshasa. 
91 KUEDIASALA, F. “Code minier, dix and déjà; Quel avenir pour les mines de la RDC?”, in 
MARYSSE, S., TSHONDA, J. (eds.), Conjonctures congolaises 2011: Chroniques et analyses 
de la RD Congo, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2012, pp. 75–96.
92 ENGLEBERT, P., MUNGONGO, E. K., op. cit.
93 YOUNG, C., TURNER, T., “The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State”, Wisconsin, University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1985, p. 43.
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this change, and enact a more equitable and developmental distribution and 
expenditure of the surplus generated by industrial mining. However, it is a 
struggle many Congolese interviewees appeared strongly committed to, often 
grounded in an awareness of the limits of CSR and the potential of state-led 
local development to sustainably overcome these limits.94
Externally, and in relation to the task of maximising state revenue capture, 
the priorities are clear. Significant economic losses are incurred by often le-
gally justified capital relations that exist within global mining production net-
works. As discussed above, Peyer et al. found the practices of one TNMC over 
one five-year period to result in $153.7 million of lost revenue to the Congole-
se state.95 Extending this finding across the mining sector and across time, it is 
plausible to imagine a scenario whereby lost state revenue tallies into the billi-
ons of dollars. Overseas tax havens must be closed down, and transfer pricing 
regulated and brought under control. Given the origin and international nature 
of these problems, this is not a task that Congolese actors can achieve alone. 
It must become a higher priority than is currently the case for external actors 
and institutions, who are often more concerned with searching for problems 
and proposing solutions in the DRC, than they are with confronting structural 
disequilibria conditioning these problems in their home countries.  
Rotterdam, July 2016
94 Freeport McMoran’s sale of its 56 percent stake in the Tenke Fungurume mine to China 
Molybdenum in May 2016 provides a recent case in point. As Freeport McMoran prepares to 
leave the DRC, what will remain of its much-heralded CSR programming?
95 PEYER, C., FEENEY, P., MERCIER, F., op. cit., p. 104.
